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FEDERAL TAXATION IN SEPARATION
AND DIVORCE
Enw Aw S. GRAVES
Two recent Circuit Court decisions I remind the practitioner in the
field of separation and divorce that opportunities are open for the
minimization, or at least the advance arrangement for the impact, of
taxes on husband and wife, and that the failure to make such arrange-
ments sufficiently specific may lead to a court's properly reaching an
inexact result.
Before the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1942,2 there was very
little that counsel could do in this area. Even though a trust might be
set up to support the taxpayer's wife, so that the income given to her
did not pass through his hands, the husband got no tax benefit from
funds paid to the ex-wife for her support either by deduction or
exclusion 8.
At the present time, counsel, with appropriate knowledge of §§ 71,
215, 682 and 152 of the I.R.C.4 and, in case of more sophisticated ar-
rangements, of § 101 and § 83, will be expected to make appropriate
arrangements for the impact of taxes, and perhaps be responsible for
failure to do so.
Ideally, although the temptation in domestic relations matters is to
give full vent to lawyer's inclination to play the role of an advocate
rather than a counsellor, the impact of taxes should be negotiated by
the parties and their attorneys with full knowledge of the applicable
facts and law. In most cases, the relationship of the parties will be a
continuing one, even in the absence of children of the marriage, but
more so if there are. While the Virginia Code 5 does permit agreements
between the parties which are not subject to change, the wisdom of
such arrangements in many instances may be questionable. Obtaining
through greater knowledge of tax law or more inflexible negotiation
an initial advantage taxwise may, in later years, make the solution of
problems subsequently arising, because of changed conditions or other-
wise, more difficult.
1Fox v. U., 510 F.2d 1330 (3rd Cir. 1975); Hayutin v. C.R., 508 F.2d 462
(10th Cir. 1975). For an interesting contrast of the effect of State Court decisions
on tax consequences, compare the Hayutin case with the Collins case, infra, Note
17.
2 Act of October 21, 1942, Ch. 619, 1 120, 56 Stat. 816.
3 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Douglas v. Wilcutts, 296 U.S. 1 (1935).
The Wilcutts decision and that in Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940) had led
to the enactment, in the Internal Revenue Act of 1942, of a remedial provision
respecting trusts. See discussion concerning trusts, text accompanying Note 31
et seq.
4 This article will use I. R. C. as shorthand for Internal Revenue Code, and will
attempt not to confuse this with references to the Code of Virginia.
a Code of Virginia, 5 20-109 and Dienbart v. Dienbart, 210 Va. 101, 168 SE-2d
279 (1969).
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One more preliminary matter: reading or summarizing tax statutes
in the abstract is not only difficult but soporific. The writer will there-
fore embark upon a discussion of the Statutes by taking a specific
case, not unrelated to reality, but of course with the names, figures, and
situation changed to protect the innocent, which will trigger appli-
cable principles.
Assume that the husband in the case has been earning adjusted gross
income of $42,000.00 per year; and that the wife has taxable gross
income from investments producing $16,000.00 after taking account
of capital gains. There are no children, or all are emancipated; and no
other dependents. Making arbitrary assumptions of the total amount of
deductions, and using the two exemptions, a joint return would produce
a federal income tax of $17,410.00.
The parties have been living apart for approximately a year, and
the husband has been paying all expenses, including utilities used by the
wife in their former marital home, which is in his name alone, but in
which she is, with his consent, continuing to live. According to his
checkbook, the wife should be able to meet most of her basic expenses
on alimony of $900.00 per month, using some of her income in the
future, as she has in the past, for some of her expenditures on herself
and gifts to the adult children. If he pays her this alimony, and we
continue the arbitrary assumptions, his tax would be $7,702.50, which
would leave him $23,498.50. If he paid the entire tax out of his
$42,000.00 while he and his wife were living together and filing a
joint return, he would have left, after alimony and income tax,
$24,590.00. Thus far, and recognizing that his wife would need ap-
proximately the amount of alimony stated to continue to live according
to the standard established during their marriage, the figures look
reasonably palatable to him.
Following the same procedure in estimating the wife's Federal income
tax, we would come up with a figure of $6,690.00, which would leave
her $20,110.00 from her $16,000.00 plus the assumed alimony of
$10,800.00. This would be contrasted with the husband's $23,498.50
after taxes.
She may be somewhat unhappy, not only because he has more money
than she does after taxes, but also because she does not like the idea
of paying so much income tax. Again, figures may help.
Calculations show that if she paid, at the lower brackets, the tax on
her $16,000.00 but required the husband to pay the additional tax on
the $10,800.00, he would pay her an additional amount of $3,200.00.
This would result in her Federal income tax being $8,017.50; but she
would have after taxes $21,982.50. The husband, assuming that he paid
her the additional $3,200.00, would pay taxes only in the amount of
$6,410.00; and after making payments to his wife totaling $14,000.00,
and the tax in the reduced amount of $6,410.00, would have left
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$21,590.00 instead of $23,498.50. The wife would have left $21,982.50
instead of $20,110.00.6
It is to be noted that the husband is paying the tax in the wife's
upper brackets. If her independent income rises, he will be paying
taxes on her alimony at even higher rates. He may demand, and be
reasonably entitled to, a limit; a suggested, somewhat complicated, pro-
vision is set out in Appendix B.
The calculations and negotiations are, of course, based on I.R.C. § 71
for taxation to the wife, and the co-relative I.R.C. § 215 permitting de-
duction by the husband. The payments by the husband to the wife must
be periodic, although, according to the express words of the Statute,
they need not be made at regular intervals. They must be made (unless
pursuant to a decree for support entered after March 1, 1954) because
of the marital or family relationship, so that, as the Regulations point
out 7, repayments by the husband to the wife of bona fide debt would
not receive the alimony treatment. They must be made, if pursuant
to a support decree, under one entered after March 1, 1954, so that
amounts ordered to be paid as temporary alimony pendente lite, for
example, would be deductible even before regular payments were
fixed. If payments are not made pursuant to such a decree, they may
receive the alimony treatment if made pursuant to three other docu-
ments.
The first of these is a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance
which requires periodic payments in discharge of a legal obligation im-
posed because of the marital or family relationship (§ 71(a) (1)). The
second is a written contract incident to a decree of divorce or separate
maintenance (§ 71 (a) (1)). The third is a written separation agreement,
entered into after August 16, 1954 (§ 71 (a)(2)). If payments are made
pursuant to a written separation agreement or a decree for support
entered after March 1, 1954, the Statutes expressly state that the ali-
mony treatment is not accorded if the husband and wife made a
single return jointly. They may do so, pursuant to I.R.C. § 6013(d) (2)
unless they are "*** Legally separated*** under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance***". Consequently § 71(a) (1) lacks the
words "This paragraph shall not apply if the husband and wife make
6 More detailed calculations are set out in Appendix A in order to furnish the
figures to the reader, and at the same time not to divert his attention from the
main stream when he reads the article. It is hardly necessary to say that it might
be possible for the husband to pay the entire tax attributable to the receipt of
alimony by the wife, but since, as he pays her taxes, he increases her income
and thereby increases her tax, the calculations would have to be much more
complicated. In addition, the husband will probably resist before he reaches the
ultimate point. If he does, Exhibit B, or something like it, may be in order. It is
of course assumed that counsel has checked to see that husband and wife are
married; if not, a complicated unscrambling of eggs may be attempted. See, e.g.,
Borax's Estate v. CI.R., 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965).
7 Treas. Regs. S 1.71-1(b) (94).
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a single return jointly"; this provision is included in both § 71(a) (2)
and (3), applying to cases in which payments are made pursuant to a
written separation agreement or a decree for support entered after
March 1, 1954.
Virginia lawyers may be concerned about whether a decree of di-
vorce a mensa et thoro is such a decree of divorce or separate mainte-
nance as triggers § 71 (a) (1). The Service has taken the position that the
statute applies to such divorces as well as to final divorces; and the
matter has been successfully ligitated by the Service with respect to a
Maryland divorce a mensa et tboro8
Turning to another aspect of our assumed case, the residence of the
parties belonged to the husband, who was permitting the wife to live
there rent free. Thus far, the rental value of the house to the wife is
not considered as alimony.9 If, instead of making payments directly
to the wife, the husband were to pay, under these circumstances, for
such items as utilities used by her in the home, these payments would
receive the alimony treatment, as payments made indirectly, to dis-
charge the wife's obligations, rather than directly to her.10 Similarly,
had the parties entered into a written separation agreement effective
after they had separated, payments made pursuant to such an agreement
by him to those furnishing other supplies or services to the wife would
have been deductible, if the parties did not make a joint return. Com-
plications arise in this area where the home is in the name of both
parties, and secures an indebtedness of the parties or of the husband
alone. If the husband continues to make payments on the note, one-
half of such payments are considered as alimony to the wife." The
soundness of this position has been questioned, since the ownership of
property given as security for the loan of X does not make the owner
of the property an obligor under X's note.12 That the position of the
Service in this regard may be unsound is illustrated by cases holding
that the husband is not entitled to alimony treatment for deferred
payments made on the security of an automobile in both names, the
possession of which is given to the wife.'3 Frequently, an agreement
or decree will provide for the husband to pay all joint indebtedness
of the parties. Such decrees or agreements may be based upon the
knowledge that creditors frequently require joint obligations of hus-
bands and wives, currently, because much of the property paid for by
8 Sullivan, 29 T.C. 71, aff'd., 256 F.2d 664.
9 Pappenbeimer v. Allen, 164 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1947). As far as the husband
is concerned, this may be affected by the provision of 5 71(d) that the husband
is not required to report income from property transferred for the use of the
wife.
10 See, e.g., R.I.A., 4 Tax Coordinator, 6023.
11 See Rev. Rul. 67-420, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 63.
12 See Graves, Federal Taxation in Separation and Divorce, XXIX Washington
and Lee Law Rev. 1 (1972).
1s See R.I.A., 4 Tax Coordinator, K-6125, p. 32,338.
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him is placed in the names of both parties as tenants by the entirety,
and property so held is not subject to the claims of creditors of the
individual husband or wife.14 The indebtedness may really be that of
the husband, the discharge of which should not be attributed as a
payment made indirectly on behalf of the wife. This is one of the
fuzzy areas in a field of the tax law which is, as above demonstrated,
otherwise reasonably clear and well settled; and counsel would be
advised to act accordingly in clarifying the agreement of the parties
or the order of the court.15
In continuing to consider the arrangements made or contemplated
by the husband and wife in our assumed situation, the wife and her
counsel may be concerned about making provisions in the event of the
husband's premature death, or failure of his earning capacity. Several
lines may be explored by counsel.
The first would be the possibility that the husband might make a
one-time transfer to the wife of property, such as the residence or
securities. This, of course, initiates the problem of the lump sum
transfer-not entitled to the alimony treatment above discussed-as
contrasted with periodic payments. In addition, a decision of the United
States Supreme Court 16 should be kept in mind since its effect may be
especially troublesome. In the Davis case, the Supreme Court held that
where property is transferred by the husband to the wife as a part of
the settlement of their marital affairs and interests, the transfer is a
taxable event, in which capital gain is recognized. The wife receives a
new basis in the property, being its market value at the time of transfer.
Knowledge of this principle may affect the negotiations, influencing
the choice of property to be transferred, or furnishing an occasion to
the husband to take offsetting losses in other securities which he holds.
14 Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951).
15 Additional problems may arise because of the placing in both names of
property purchased by the husband. For example, I.R.C. § 2515 shields the parties
from gift tax as to real estate placed in both names; and such property, so held
until the death of one of the spouses, is then subject to estate tax based upon
its value at date of death and the proportionate part of its cost contributed by the
decedent. Sec. 2516 shields from gift tax a transfer of property made pursuant
to a written agreement entered into within two years of a divorce decree. If a
tenancy by the entirety in real estate is automatically severed, so that the wife
becomes a tenant in common of a residence completely paid for by the husband,
the transfer of the property interest to her is effected by provisions of law
rather than by the written agreement contemplated by I.R.C. § 2516. Is a gift
tax due? The question may be more acute when property other than real estate
is put into the names of husband and wife. Such a transfer is not shielded from
gift tax by I.R.C. § 2515; and dormant questions of gift taxation may be brought
to the surface by the separation of the parties. These and other questions, in-
triguing and perhaps not definitively answered, are beyond the scope of this
discussion; but it is hoped that this footnote will alert counsel to their possibility.
16 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
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In addition, of course, the husband may decide, because of Davis, not
to make a transfer which he is otherwise willing to do.
The Davis case is not applied where the wife receives her pro rata
part of property to the acquisition of which she has contributed,
whether the property is in the name of the husband alone or in both
names. In the Collins case,17 the husband transferred to the wife a
substantial amount of closely held stock, but by means of knowledge-
able negotiations and agreement between the parties, the court ulti-
mately accepted the argument that the wife had received from the
husband only the fruits of her own investment. On the other hand, in
the Hayutin case,'8 while the fact was undisputed that the wife had
from time to time furnished the husband with substantial amounts of
money, the parties failed to agree on an allocation to the wife of an
interest in the husband's property. Consequently, the lower court made
an allocation of current payments between alimony and repayment
which evidently impressed husband and wife as arbitrary, since both
appealed. The Circuit Court refused to require a further delving into
the facts, and affirmed the decision of the lower court, on the ground
that the record showed that there was a "rational basis" for its decision.
A comparison of the Collins and Hayutin cases leads to the conclusion
that taxes may be minimized, and the husband protected from a capital
gains tax if the facts are appropriate.
The Davis decision always should be kept in mind where the resi-
dence of the parties is in the names of both, and the husband wishes
to convey his interest to the wife. If, as in the situation which we have
postulated, the home belongs to the husband, and he agrees to convey
it to her, he will realize gain if the property has appreciated. If the
wife agrees that she will give up the residence if he will furnish her
another, serious consideration should be given to his increasing the
alimony in the amount necessary for her to rent an apartment, or his
paying the rent on an apartment for her. In either case, the payments
would get the alimony treatment. On the other hand, if he attempts
to buy another house for her, either outright or by assuming payments
secured by the new residence, no alimony treatment will be accorded
his payments unless arrangements are so made that they may qualify
as periodic payments. 19
This brings us to consideration of I.R.C. § 71 (c).
If the husband and wife agree that he will transfer a principal sum
to her instead of (or in addition to) the periodic payments which we
first discussed, alimony treatment will be accorded to the payment
17 Collins V. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
18 See note 1, supra.
19 Ideally from a tax point of view, the husband might rent his house to the
wife, giving her additional alimony in the amount of rent and approximately the
income tax on the additional alimony. He can then, in addition to deducting the
increased alimony, deduct landlord's expenses, including depreciation.
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of the principal sum if it is made over more than ten years in equal
annual installments, or the full payment thereof is subject to. the con-
tingencies of (a) the remarriage of the wife, (b) the death of either
party, or (c) a sufficient change in the economic status of either
party.20
In the Fox case,21 the husband agreed to pay to wife the sum of
$1,000,000.00 over a period of 9 A years. The opinion of the Court,
while denying what it termed "innovative contentions" of the taxpayer,
took note of the fact that the parties contracted with knowledge of the
applicable tax statutes, arranging for the wife to receive a lump sum of
money without the imposition of tax to her and without a deduction
for the husband.
The impact of the two "lump sum" rules permitting alimony treat-
ment to what would not qualify as periodic payments under § 71 (a)
may be illustrated and clarified by consideration of measures which may
be adopted to obtain the deduction of a substantial part of the wife's
attorney's fees. Such fees, attributable to the termination of the marital
status, may not be deducted by either party; and the husband may
not, at least without considerable trouble, get any tax benefit from his
payment of attorney's fees for work done on the settlement agreement
(except for tax work under § 212(3)).22 The wife, however, in pay-
ing fees to obtain the husband's agreement to pay her alimony, is ex-
pending money for the production or collection of income; and her
expenses, including counsel fees, are thus expressly deductible under
Statute.23 Her attorney must allocate and bill her separately for the
time he has spent in such endeavor; and she may thereupon deduct her
payment to him. She can also, like her husband, deduct amounts paid
for tax services deductible under I.R.C. § 212(3).24 If the husband can
take a tax deduction for any part or all of the wife's attorney's fees,
it is more likely that he will agree to bear all or part of this expense.
There are three possibilities of so arranging these additional payments
to the wife as to make them deductible by the husband. First, the
husband may agree to pay the full amount over ten years and one
month. While lawyers often have to wait a considerable time to be
20 The contingency rule is a creation of the Regulations, S 1.71-1 (d) (3). Note
the peculiar Virginia Statute, Code of Virginia, § 20-109, which may prevent
the court from making a change in the agreement of the parties. See note 5,
supra.
21 See note 1, supra.
22 See United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963) and United States v. Gilmore,
372 US. 39 (1963).
23 See I.R.C. S 212(1).
24For a discussion of the deductibility of costs of advice concerning tax
planning, see R.IA., 4 Tax Coordinator L-1922, specifically relating to such
advice in domestic relations matters, and L-2001 et seq., discussing the subject
generally. Counsel should bill separately for such work and advise his client
to deduct it.
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paid, they seldom have to spread their compensation over so long a
period; and such a possible arrangement would certainly not be popular
with the Domestic Relations Bar.
Second, for payments to be periodic under I.R.C. § 71 (a), they need
not be uniform. They may be pegged, for example, to the husband's
earnings, to the cost of living, to other inflationary or deflationary safe-
guards, or to a combination.2 It should be recognized by all, including
the Service, that a wife will incur some unusual expenses, including
litigation costs, when the marriage is ended. If several of the first
payments by the husband to the wife are larger than subsequent ones,
they may still receive § 71 (a) treatment although an astute agent might
successfully take the position that they add up to a lump sum payable
over ten years or less, and are consequently not periodic. If these
first increased payments are markedly greater than subsequent pay-
ments, it is believed that the Service may be more likely to take the
position that they are disguised installment payments of a lump sum.26
The third method is to make these as well as other payments qualify
under one of the contingencies referred to in Regulation 1.71-1 (d) (3)-
(i) (a) (b). If they are subject to termination or change by, for example,
the remarriage of the wife or the death of either spouse, then they are
periodic, and the Service may not successfully take a contrary position.
The attorney, furnishing the occasion for deduction of his charges
by two taxpayers, may not still be fully compensated for his work; but
he stands a better chance of submitting a bill satisfactory to him and
having it paid; and he should be accorded more appreciation by his
client and even his adversary.
There are two more features of the two exceptions providing alimony
treatment for lump sum distributions. An annual payment qualifying
under the more-than-ten-year rule may not be deducted if it is greater
than 10% of the lump sum, unless it is to make up arrears.27 This limi-
tation does not apply to lump sum payments qualifying under the con-
tingencies rule. If an annual installment of a lump sum payment qualifies
under both the more-than-ten-year rule and the coritingencies rule,
it is entitled to the alimony treatment even though it is more than 10%
of the lump sum. 28
The husband's payment of a lump sum, in addition to or in view
of periodic payments, has many uses in the marital settlement. Counsel
should be prepared, not only to make knowledgeable use of it (like
counsel in the Fox case); and should also be sufficiently knowledgeable
and on his guard to keep his client from being unwittingly caught with
a non-alimony lump sum treatment when alimony treatment was con-
templated.
25 For a draft of a combination, see Appendix C.
26 See Secirest v. U.S., 490 F.2d 102 (4th Cir., 1974).
2TSee Treas. Regs. S 1.71-1(d) (2).
2 8 See Treas. Regs. 5 1.71-1(d) (4).
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In addition to exploring the possibility of the transfer of property
to the wife in a single transaction or by installments spread over ten
years or less the wife and her attorney may wish to consider other
means of obtaining security for her. One which will frequently be
thought of is the transfer of insurance policies on the life of the
husband. Unfortunately, Congress has not seen fit to include the trans-
fer of life insurance in domestic relation settlements among the excep-
tions to I.R.C. § 101(a) (2),29 and the wife may consequently have to
treat insurance proceeds on the husband's death as taxable income. Of
course there are worse things than including the net amount of life
insurance in the wife's gross income on the death of the husband; one
is for the wife to get nothing at all upon his death. A solution which
might be appropriate in this situation is for the wife to purchase and
pay for term insurance on the husband's life.3 0 Especially if the parties
are sufficiently advanced in years, such insurance should be obtained
to tide over the wife during the years immediately preceding her
right to Social Security payments, if this exists, and Medicare. Insurance
so acquired would not trigger the tax consequences of I.R.C. § 101 (a)-
(2), but would comply with the beneficent provisions of § 101 (a) (1).
Another possibility is the husband's creating a trust to make payments
to the wife as a part of the settlement of marital difficulties; this device
is of considerable vintage.31 I.R.C. § 71 (see especially sub-section (d))
and I.R.C. § 682 were obviously inspired by these efforts. The Service
suffered a defeat in the only recent case considering the tax impact
upon the wife of the receipt of payments from a trust of which she is
made the beneficiary as a result of negotiations to settle marital prop-
erty rights.82 It has nevertheless adhered to its position that all payments
made under a trust which is to be regarded as a § 71 trust are taxable
to the wife, whether they represent payments of principal or interest
on tax free securities, as ordinary taxable income.33 On the other hand,
the Service acknowledges that the ordinary Rules applicable to the
taxation of the beneficiary of a trust are applicable to the wife if she
is beneficiary of a § 682 trust.3 4 This would result, if the wife were
distributed either principal or tax-free income, in her receiving the
funds free from income tax consequences.
The problem, then, is how to tell whether the trust for the wife
is a § 71 or a § 682 trust. The Service and a substantial number of com-
29 Among the favored exemptions are transfers to a partner of the insured, to
a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corporation in which
the insured is a shareholder or officer. Why such transfers appealed to Congress
as more deserving of favorable tax treatment than the settlement of marital rights
remains a mystery.
30 She has an insurable interest.
31 See note 3, supra.
32 Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1969).
33 See Treas. Regs. § 1.71-1(c) (2) and (3).
34 See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.682(a)-1(a) (2), 1.682(b)-1 (a).
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mentators cling to the position that a § 71 trust is one that has been
established to discharge a husband's obligation to make alimony pay-
ments to his wife, whereas a § 682 trust is one that was established prior
to and not in contemplation of the marital difficulties).5 If the husband
is able and willing to provide payments to the wife from a trust and
one has not been established, it may be to the wife's interest to ne-
gotiate for its establishment. If payments that would be tax-free to her
are subsequently made, she may take the position that the Ellis case
is sound, even though the Service may take the position that a step
transaction was involved. It is possible that the Service may be wrong
and the Ellis Court right. The husband is not affected by the position
the wife takes in this situation. All payments made to the wife from
property transferred by him, whether in trust for the wife or by his
purchase of an annuity for her or otherwise, are excluded from his gross
income.36
The parties may wish to negotiate the assignment to the wife of
an employee plan of which the husband is beneficiary. In view of the
recent legislation in this field, and the lack of clear authority, no
attempt will be made in this article to discuss the tax implications of
the use of such property in marital settlements.8 7
The example of a marital settlement involving husband and wife
alone has been thus far treated. In addition to the Statutes and authori-
ties above set forth, additional Rules are brought into play where the
support of children 38 is involved.
I.R.C. § 71(b) expressly provides that the alimony treatment shall
not apply to payments by the husband to wife which the decree or
agreement "fix" as for the support of minor children of the husband. 9
95See, as setting out another point of view, XXIX Washington and Lee Law
Rev., supra, note 12, at pp. 14-17.
30IR.C., 9§ 71(d), 682 (a). This may adversely affect the amount the husband
may deduct for charitable donations, medical expenses, and any other items with
a limitation based on his gross income.
a7 The matter was subject of a discussion at the American Bar Association
meeting in Montreal in August, 1975.88 Most of the rules available concern the support of minor children. The
husband and/or wife (see, for example, Code of Virginia, SS 20-91(9) (c), 20-103,
20-107, 20-109, 20-110, and 20-115 illustrating the recently created obligation
of support of a spouse and children irrespective of the sex of the obligor) may
have to support an adult child. The question of an exemption based on the sup-
port of a child who has reached his majority, when the parent may be required
to continue to support him because of his educational requirements or because
of his being handicapped, has not as yet been adequately covered in the
Federal Tax Statutes. "Minor", determined under Federal law, still means a
person under 21. See R.I.A., 4 Tax Coordinator, K-6130, p. 32,342.
89 I.R.C. § 682 also so provides. If the husband does not pay the entire amount
which he has agreed or been ordered to pay for the wife and children, I.R.C.
5 71(b) expressly provides that it is regarded as child support and the excess, if
any, as alimony. This is obviously intended to impose a tax penalty on husbands
who do not pay the full amount required for the support of the wife and children.
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The United States Supreme Court held that the word "fix" means
what it says; and that a payment of a sum for the support of the wife
and children will all receive the alimony treatment, even though it is
decreased by a definite amount as a child is emancipated.40
A recent Virginia case41 involved the efforts of a wife, caught in
the toils of the Lester doctrine, to extricate herself. Her agreement with
her husband approved by the court without objection and therefore
unchangeable 42 under § 20-109 of the Code of Virginia, provided
$930.00 per month for the support of the wife and three children, which
sum would be reduced by $150.00 per month upon the death or eman-
cipation of each child. The wife attempted to "split" the agreement by
asking that the support for the children be increased (this not being
subject to the inflexible principal of 20-109), and that the trial court,
accordingly, determine which part of the $930.00 was for the wife and
which part for the children. The husband resisted such allocation on the
ground that his tax consequences would be adversely affected. The
trial court ruled that the amount being paid for the support of the
children was sufficient, but that the wife was nevertheless entitled to
have the amount paid as alimony and the amount as child support
allocated; and ordered the husband to pay $480.00 per month as alimony
and a total of $450.00 per month for the three children. The Supreme
Court reversed, saying (p. 697):
"If (the Trial Court) had decided that more child support was
warranted, it could have provided therefor merely by adding to the
existing award, increasing the total the husband would be required
to pay the wife. This disposition would have retained the unitary
character of the award, thus protecting the tax benefits to which
the husband was entitled under the agreement. Such disposition also
would have avoided a possible violation of Code Sec. 20-109 and
would have preserved the court's continuing power .to supervise
child support under Code Sec. 20-108.
"The Trial Court having determined, however, that circumstances
had not so changed as to warrant an increase in child support, there
was no necessity even to consider the wife's prayer to apportion
the award. The Court should have dismissed the wife's petition."
The soundness of the Lester doctrine, even though withstanding such
collateral attacks as Mrs. Wickham attempted, is subject to question.
This being so, the decision may be, and has been, distinguished on
somewhat flimsy grounds.43 The Fourth Circuit in the West case, and
40 Commissioner vJ. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
41 Wickam v. Wickham, 215 Va. 694, 213 S.E.2d 752 (1975).42 Code of Vir inia, 5 20-109; Dienbart v. Dienbart, supra, note 5. This applies
only to alimon or the wife; support for the children may be changed pursuant
to Code of Virginia, § 20-108.4SWest v. United States, 413 U.S. 294 (4th Cir. 1969); Commissioner v.
Gottbe/f, 407 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the Second Circuit in the Gotthelf case have done so, when, in addition
to providing for the termination of a specific amount of the payment
to the wife as a child was emancipated, there was some adjuration that
the wife should spend a certain amount on the children. Counsel
should therefore have all four cases in mind when agreements or
decrees are drafted, so that the parties will be assured of the tax impact
of payments to the wife which are essentially for the support of the
children. If the husband is generous and affluent enough, the payments
may be larger and lumped together; if not, the wife may well desire
that they be "fixed" in the Lester sense.
I.R.C. § 152(e) provides rules which are of considerable assistance
in determining which of the parents is entitled to the exemption for a
dependent child, although as the examples set forth in the Regulations
illustrate, somewhat surprising results may be produced when the
non-custodial parent is entitled to the exemption for a child even though
the custodial parent has furnished more of the child's support than the
non-custodial parent. 4 At the very least, § 152(e) and the Regulations
promulgated thereunder should be helpful in bringing pressure to bear
on each of the parents to disclose figures to the other parent in con-
nection with a claim for exemption.
For § 152(e) to apply, four requirements must be met: first, one or
both parents must provide more than one-half of the child's total sup-
port during the calendar year in question; second, such child must have
been in the custody of one or both of his parents for more than one-
half of such year; third, there must not be an effective multiple support
agreement under I.R.C. § 152(e); and fourth, the parents may not file
a joint return for the year in question. If these requirements are met,
then the general rule is that the parent having greater custody of the
child claims him as an exemption.
As an exception to this general rule, the non-custodial parent may
take the exemption for the child if, first, he provides at least $600.00
for the child; second, a decree of divorce, a decree of separate mainte-
nance, or a written agreement between the parents provides that the
non-custodial parent shall be entitled to the exemption; and third,
the non-custodial parent, where the right to the exemption is created
by an agreement, attaches a copy of the agreement to his tax return.
There is another exception. If the non-custodial parent contributes
a total of $1,200.00 for the support of the child or children of the
parties, he is entitled to the exemption or exemptions, in spite of the
contrary provisions of the decree of divorce, the decree of separation,
or the written agreement, unless the custodial parent clearly establishes
that she provided in fact more for the support of the child claimed by
the non-custodial parent than did the non-custodial parent. Failure of
either of the competing parents to furnish an itemized statement of
1.C. $ 152(e); Treas. Regs. 5 1.152-4(f).
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claimed support authorizes the Service agent to deny the exemption to
such non-cooperative parent."
The Statute and Regulations, respectively, attempt to forestall ques-
tions and difficulties in two respects. The non-custodial parent often
questions whether the amounts of money he has furnished for child
support are actually expended for child support. The Statute entitles
him to be treated for these tax purposes as if all of the money he
furnished the custodial parent was expended for the support of the
child, whether it was or not.4 6
The Regulations 47 forestall disputes about the meaning of "custody".
Custody is taken to be that fixed by the decree or the agreement; and
if the decree or agreement is not definite or may not be in effect,
then the term means "physical custody".
Some might say that the treatment of periodic payments of alimony,
of lump sums paid in installments, and of exemptions for dependent
children permit juggling with respect to taxes. Others would say that
such treatment permits varied allocations, in the difficult situation
where marriage has ended, directed toward minimizing expenses, fa-
cilitating the maintenance of two households, and doing so in a manner
that will make each of the aggrieved parties feel that he is being fairly
treated and is treating the other fairly: and this is a consummation
devoutly to be desired.
Thus far we have considered the income tax aspects of divorce and
separation. Gift and Estate taxes will be treated briefly to cover this
aspect of the subject.
The estate planner, is, of course, duty bound to consider all pos-
sibilities for the minimization of transfer and succession taxes. He need
not go as far as one astute lawyer who suggested that it was so easy
to avoid Gift taxes in the marital settlement situation that his clients
should get a friendly divorce in order to effect tax-free transfers; and
then remarry and continue on their happy marital career.
Several have, however, been tempted, by the device of pre-marital
agreements, or, less preferably, agreements during marriage, to trans-
form a gift to a widow into an obligation, the consideration furnished
by her being the relinquishment of marital rights.48 Congress decided
to block this maneuver by the enactment of what is now I.R.C.§ 2043 (b), applicable to estate taxes, which provides that the relinquish-
ment of dower or curtesy, a statutory estate in view thereof, or other
marital rights does not constitute consideration. Consequently an agree-
ment by the husband to pay the widow a sum of money based on such
consideration was ineffective to bar the estate tax.
4 Treas. Regs. 5 1.152-4(e) (4).4te IRC. 5 152 (e) (2).
4TTreas. Regs. § 1.152-4(b).
48 See, e.g., Dwight W. Ellis, Jr., 51 T.C. 182 (1968).
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The statutory provision was not applicable to gift taxes; but by
two decisions, the United States Supreme Court decided that, since
estate and gift taxes were in pari materia, the substance of the statute
would be used to block the same maneuver in the gift tax field.4'
Where marriage has run into difficulties, and property settlement
agreements are being made, there is obviously little question of a gift.
Nevertheless, a transfer by the husband to the wife in relinquishment
of her marital rights in his property would, under the Supreme Court
decisions, constitute a gift, since this relinquishment is not consideration.
It is, however, easy to avoid the impact of gift taxes in such trans-
actions. The first is another creation of the United States Supreme
Court, 5 to the effectthat if the transfer of property is made pursuant
to a decree of a court which has power to order the transfer, the
transfer is not without consideration, and is free from gift tax. This
result follows even though the decree is based upon a property settle-
ment agreement which expressly provides that it shall survive a court
decree.
The second way of avoiding gift taxes is the support way. Property
transferred by the husband, pursuant to an agreement incident to a
separation, in satisfaction of his obligation to support the wife, is free
from gift tax; the relinquishment of her right to require him to support
her is consideration.-1 A priori it would have been thought that the
phrase "other marital rights" in § 2043(b) and the Supreme Court
cases applying the statute to the gift tax field would have included the
right of the wife to demand that the husband support her. It is gratify-
ing to see that the statute and the case law have been so intelligently in-
terpreted and applied, since obviously there is no gift in this situation.
This interpretation is also a notable example of the application of
the eiusdem generis rule in the construction of a writing.
The decree and support ways of avoiding gift taxes are equally ap-
plicable to the avoidance of estate taxes.
There is one flaw in the principles applicable in this field. Thus far
no cognizance has been taken of the obligation of the husband to sup-
port his adult children in two situations: supporting a handicapped
adult child; and educating an adult child. Amounts furnished by the
husband for the support of a child in these two situations have not as
yet been held free from gift or estate taxes.
The third way of avoiding gift taxes is applicable only to the gift
tax, and is based upon a special statute.52 This statute provides that
where husband and wife enter into a written property settlement agree-
49 Merrill v. Fabs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 US.
303 (1945).
BoHarris v. Commissioner, 340 US. 106 (1950).
51 Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 Cum. Bul. 414; Commissioner v. Nelson, 396 F.2d
519 (2d Cir., 1968).
5 I,.R.Q. 2516.
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ment, and divorce occurs within two years thereafter (irrespective of
whether the decree approves the agreement), transfers of property
pursuant to the agreement either to the wife or for the support of minor
children are transfers for consideration, and so are not subject to the
gift tax.
Questions may arise that are not strictly in the field of this topic;
and a word of warning may be in order. Since World War II, the
custom has grown apace of the husband's placing property in the
names of himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety. After the
practice had been going on for some years, without a correlative filing
of gift tax returns, Congress enacted a relief section, I.R.C. § 2515, re-
lieving the husband from the obligation of filing a gift tax return, unless
he elected to do so. The difficulty is that this section applies only to
real property. The husband may place stocks, bonds, savings accounts,
and other personal property, tangible and intangible, in the tenancy by
the entirety; and one suspects that many such donors do not file
required gift tax returns.53 This is the kind of question that can be
brought to light when the parties separate. The wife may easily demand
a portion of the property title to which she shares with her husband,
and which is converted by divorce into a tenancy in common per-
mitting her to require partition. 4 Counsel should be alert to the
possibility that the filing of gift tax returns may have been or be in
order.
CONCLUSION
By and large, Congress and the Service have done a good job in the
field of divorce and separation. If there is a reasonably full disclosure
of the assets and earnings of the parties, a reasonable recognition by the
parties and their counsel that unbridled advocacy will probably not
lead to sound results, and a sufficient knowledge of the applicable law
to take full advantage of its flexibility so that different arrangements
can be made that should come close to satisfying individual personali-
ties with their varying feelings of fairness, considerable constructive
work can be done toward minimizing taxes and directing their impact.
There are three sets of potential tax traps, one arising out of domestic
relations as well as tax laws, one created by Supreme Court decisions,
and a third created by Congress. The first set would include the de-
termination whether husband and wife are married, the confusion of the
security for an obligation with the obligation itself, and the care
required to distinguish numbers such as "more than ten years" from
"$1,200 or more". The Supreme Court decisions to watch are Davis
(creating a capital gains trap in this situation); Lester (holding that
43 See Rev. Rul. 75-507, illustrating how a husband may, perhaps unwittingly,
incur gift taxes.
54 See, e.g., Code of Virginia, 5 6.1-73 and 5 20.111.
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payments not "fixed" for the children may be taxable to the wife); and
Patfick (making difficult the deduction of counsel fees). Those prob-
lems created by Congress are, first, the difficulty of determining
whether a trust is a § 71 or a § 682 trust; and, second, the failure to
except from income taxes the proceeds of life insurance transferred as a
part of a marital settlement.
Avoiding these traps, the careful lawyer can plan with considerable
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Many W's are accustomed to H's paying all the income taxes, so
that they enjoy their separate income tax free.
But some don't: so let's assume that this W is willing to pay on her
income but wants H to pay the tax on her alimony. H doesn't like
this, but the figures may help:
W. would have to pay on $16,000.00 $3,830.00
She is having to pay 6,970.00
3,140.00
If H pays her taxes, she will of course have to report that,
but let's see:
$26,800.00

















































The Husband shall pay to the Wife, monthly, as basic alimony for
her support, the sum of $1,100.00 beginning August, 1975, and con-
tinuing through March, 1976, and $900.00 in April, 1976 and each
month thereafter; and will also pay an additional amount because of
increased Federal and State Income taxes to the Wife. Such additional
amounts shall be calculated each year as follows:
To the Wife's income for Federal Tax purposes from sources other
than such monthly alimony (known as her independent income
herein) shall be added the sum thereof, being for example $5,500.00 in
1975; $11,400.00 in 1976, and $10,800.00 thereafter; the Federal In-
come Tax shall be calculated on such total; the Federal Income Tax
shall then be calculated on the Wife's independent income; and the
Husband shall pay to the Wife the difference plus the income tax to
the Wife because of the receipt of payment for such difference: pro-
vided, however, that if the Wife's taxable income in such year (her
independent income after subtracting her deductions and her ex-
emptions) shall be greater than $16,000.00, her independent income
after subtracting such deductions and exemptions shall nevertheless
be fixed at $16,000.00 for the purpose of this calculation. State In-
come taxes shall be calculated in the same manner and subject to the
same proviso.
The payment of such additional amount shall be made quarterly, with
adjustments to be made annually.
APPENDIX C
Automatic Increase or Decrease in Basic Alimony.
The basic alimony fixed in Par. A. hereof is based on the Cost of
Living Index of The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of
Labor as of July, 1975, when the Index was 162.3. Each year, as of
January, beginning January, 1976, the percentage increase or decrease
in such Index shall be ascertained, the first period being from July,
1975, to January, 1976, and thereafter for annual periods from January
to January. There shall also be ascertained the increase or decrease
in the adjusted gross income of the Husband, from one calendar year to
the next, the first comparison to be of the years 1974 and 1975. If
such Index has by January, 1976, decreased by as much as one per cent
(1%) from such figure of 162.3, thenz the basic alimony for 1976
shall be decreased by the same percentage difference. If, however, such
Index has increased by as much as one per cent (1%), the basic alimony
for 1976 shall be increased by the lesser of the same percentage or
the percentage of increase of the Husband's adjusted gross income for
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1975 over 1974. Thereafter said alimony shall be decreased or in-
creased in the same manner for succeeding years in which such monthly
payments are required to be made. In ascertaining the Husband's ad-
justed gross income, no account shall be taken of any amounts credited
to any retirement fund for his account.
